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Student, to whom the rhetoric may come easily, but who must learn what he can 
about tactics and coercion. This difficulty apart, and a slip-up which translates 
Stockholm from Sweden to Denmark, the book has no flaws. 
In addition to the text, the book includes a good bibliography and two useful 
appendices. The reviewer recommends this book for anyone who may have some 
responsibility for responding to and managing a terrorist incident. 
D.C. 
Ambassador Frank J. Devine 
El Salvador: Embassy Under Attack 
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As we watch the unfolding tragedy of El Salvador from the safety of our living 
rooms, we are apt to become so preoccupied with the daily television horror that 
we neglect the past and the future. If North Americans and Europeans are to 
contribute to the resolution of this conflict, they have to clear their minds of 
images and symbols, and of the propaganda that colours most reports from that 
unhappy land, and try to comprehend the present through study of the past. 
Only in the light of knowledge and understanding can we begin to address future 
options. 
Frank Devine's book is a valuable source of knowledge. As United States 
Ambassador to El Salvador 1977-1980, the author was a close observer during 
the period when that country endured Marxist terrorism, counter terror by 
authority or by vigilante groups of the Right, a revolutionary coup that failed to 
resolve the conflict, and the slow, deadly slide towards civil war. As a diplomat, 
trying to interpret what were sometimes confused and contradictory instructions 
from Washington to Salvadorian leaders, Devine was at the centre of this storm. 
And he was also at the middle of two other, related tempests. 
One concerned his personal safety. As Paul Wilkinson pointed out in the 
Spring 1981 issue of this journal,1 the profession of diplomat must now rank as 
one of the most dangerous in the world. Devine's departure to his Salvadorian 
mission had to be postponed because rightist terrorists planned to kill him on his 
arrival. The conspirators' intention had evidently been to leave evidence point-
ing to Marxist culpability, thus turning American public opinion against the left 
and justifying a repressive counter. Hardly had he and his family settled into 
their new home when it became apparent that the Marxist groups were planning 
his kidnap. Careful and involved measures were needed to thwart this plan. 
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Additionally, in September 1978 and October 1979, the U.S. Embassy was 
attacked, and in June 1980 the Devine's residence was bombed. The successful 
defence of the embassy in the second and most determined assault demonstrated 
how good planning, strong leadership and cool nerves can repel armed attack. 
This admirable example was, alas, overshadowed only five days later by the 
debacle in Tehran. The western media, fascinated by disaster and recrimination, 
focussed public attention or Iran and neglected the Salvadorian success story. 
The third hurricane that swirled around Ambassador Devine was generated 
by the Human Rights activists in the United States, who had a power base in the 
State Department. Inspired by noble motives, but blinded by ideology, this 
movement promoted their beliefs and policies with all the passion and much of 
the tyranny of the Spanish Inquisition. Devine writes: 
"My own presence on the Salvadorian scene was somewhat questioned 
and resented by many human rights advocates. When I set out to deter-
mine the facts and form my own conclusions, they criticized me for not 
accepting their word that El Salvador was a human rights violator. They 
were also critical of my preference for quiet diplomacy as opposed to 
resounding public statements of condemnation. Some did not like my 
practice of seeking to utilize a mix of inducements as opposed to purely 
retaliatory ones. Perhaps, most revealing of all was the letter that one 
human rights activist wrote to another at the time when Assistant 
Secretary of State Terence Todman — also on their black list — was 
transferred from Washington to be Ambassador to Spain. The human 
rights activist wrote, 'Now that Todman is gone, perhaps Devine's 
position will be weakened. The trouble with Ambassador Devine is that he 
is neither pro-Government nor pro-Opposition. He thinks his job is to be 
objective!'" 
With friends like these, the author really did not need enemies, but he had 
these in plenty too, both of the Salvadorian Right and Left. The objectivity in 
his profession is equally apparent in his writing. Nowhere does he claim superior 
insights or a monopoly of moral virtue, and he is content to tell his story without 
drawing too many conclusions. This is not a history book, but it contains much 
information that will be invaluable to those who will write the history of El 
Salvador's nightmare struggle. The style is easy, and the story of this modest 
man's astonishing tour makes compelling reading. To the general reader and 
Latin American specialist alike, this book is recommended. 
M.T. 
1. Paul Wilkinson, "After Tehran", in Conflict Quarterly, Vol 1, No 4 (1981). 
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